The standard method for establishing the comparative statics of risk changes in optimization problems has been con…ned to comparing unique interior solutions, relying on strong assumptions about payo¤ functions and decision variables. We propose a simple and intuitive approach that hinges on considerably weaker assumptions. Merging insights from the monotone comparative statics literature with insights from the risk apportionment literature, we show that the ranking of simple lottery pairs is all that is needed for establishing the comparative statics of risk changes. We use this approach to analyze the comparative statics of Nth-degree stochastic dominance shifts in a general setting with one and with multiple decision variables, and we show how these results can be applied to generalize the classical theories of precautionary saving, self-protection, and others.
Introduction
Given the ubiquitous nature of decision making under uncertainty, it is not surprising that a substantial amount of research has been devoted to analyze how changes in risk a¤ect economic behavior. In this line of research, the most common method for characterizing the comparative statics of risk changes in optimization problems typically consists of two parts. First, it is established that the problem under consideration has a unique interior solution by relying on a number of 'subordinate' assumptions (e.g. smooth and strictly concave payo¤ function, Inada conditions, I am extremely grateful to four anonymous reviewers, an anonymous associate editor, and the department editor Jim Smith for their very insightful comments and constructive suggestions which have contributed greatly to the improvement of the manuscript. I also thank Louis Eeckhoudt, Luciana Echazu, and William T. Smith for helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of the manuscript.
y Clarkson University, School of Business. P.O.Box 5790, Potsdam NY. Email: dnocetti@clarkson.edu convex choice sets). Second, stochastic dominance theorems are applied to …rst order conditions to establish the set of payo¤ functions that always respond to the change in risk in a particular manner. As Milgrom and Shannon (1994) point out, the only role that the …rst set of assumptions play in the comparative statics exercise is as 'servants to a method', frequently hindering the economic signi…cance and the generality of the results. For example, in the classical problem of precautionary saving (e.g. Leland (1968) , Kimball (1990) ), it is typically assumed that the saving technology is continuous and linear, that consumers are risk averse, and that there is a unique interior solution. Given these assumptions, it is well known that a prudent consumer (i.e. one with convex marginal utility) will save more when faced with a higher risk in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) . Yet, in a recent article Crainich et al. (2013) showed that risk lovers will also exhibit precautionary saving behavior if they are prudent. Therefore, at least in the precautionary saving problem, risk aversion is not necessary for the comparative statics result. In that problem, we may also wonder if a prudent consumer will also save more if the asset under consideration can only be purchased in discrete monetary amounts, or if saving is in the form of a take it or leave it project, or if capital has increasing returns. We show that, under certain regularity conditions, this is indeed the case.
More generally, we consider the following problem. Let EU (x;~ ) denote the payo¤ function for a given agent, where x is a choice vector and~ is a random variable. We ask: When, and in what sense, can we say that the optimal choice of x increases when~ undergoes an increase in risk (within a given class of risk increases)? Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) , and a multitude of authors after them, have evaluated di¤erent applications of this problem when the risk change is a mean preserving spread as de…ned by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) . More recently, the e¤ect of higher order risk changes has received a substantial amount of attention. 1 As mentioned above, the standard approach has been con…ned to comparing unique interior solutions, relying on strong assumptions about payo¤ functions and decision variables. In this paper, we present a simple and intuitive approach for comparative statics of risk that hinges on considerably weaker assumptions.
Our method builds upon two research strands. First, following Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger optimization problems. We show that establishing the set of decision makers that unambiguously rank properly-designed lottery pairs is all that is needed to order the set of maximizers (i.e. without any additional subordinate assumption).
The machinery required to establish such a result comes from the literature on monotone comparative statics (see e.g. Topkis (1978) , Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , and Milgrom and Shannon (1994) for early developments of the theory). 2 With a few exceptions, the objective in this literature has been to determine the comparative statics of deterministic changes in one or more exogenous variables of the model without relying on the assumptions of the standard approach based on the implicit function theorem (e.g. small changes in the parameters, unique interior solutions shifts, a subset of …rst-degree stochastic dominance. 3 Ormiston and Schlee (1993) had previously analyzed this problem under the assumption that a unique interior solution always exists. More recently, Quah and Strulovici (2009) extended Athey's result to a class of functions larger than S. 4 In this paper, we are similarly interested in obtaining robust conclusions about the comparative statics of distributional shifts. However, we focus on a larger class of shifts than those ordered by the MLR order (namely, Nth-degree stochastic dominance shifts), and our objective is to establish the set of decision makers for which this given class of risk changes induces a particular behavior, placing special emphasis on how this set relates to preferences over simple lotteries.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we revisit the canonical precautionary saving model as a motivating example. After providing some basic background and reviewing some existing re- 
Motivating example
Consider the standard 2-date model of precautionary saving. In the absence of risk, the consumer has an income ‡ow (y 0 ; y 1 ) and selects a consumption plan (c 0 ; c 1 ) by means of a savings technology that transforms date-0 income into date-1 income, one-to-one. Thus, given a level of savings x;
the agent consumes c 0 = y 0 x at date-0 and c 1 = x + y 1 at date-1. His objective is to maximize utility of lifetime consumption U (x; y 1 ) = u (y 0 x) + v (x + y 1 ). Naturally, we assume that the period utility functions u and v are increasing and, as usual, we will use numerical superscripts to denote the derivatives of these and other functions. 5 To simplify notation, and without any loss of generality, we will also assume that y 1 = 0: The consumer's problem under certainty can then be depicted as follows,
Now suppose that a mean zero risk~ is added to the deterministic level of date-1 income y 1 = 0.
In this case the consumer has
The textbook method for establishing comparative statics results in this context (e.g. Gollier A. Given concavity of U (i.e. u (2) < 0 and v (2) < 0), the condition v (3) (x) 0 then implies that, to restore the …rst order condition, we must have x 2 x 1 .
Using this model, and assuming that u (x) = v (x) and B = [0; y 0 ] ; Crainich et al. (2013) recently showed that risk lovers (i.e. v (2) (x) 0) also exhibit precautionary saving behavior if
We will now show that their result is an example of a more general phenomenon.
Consider the following pair of 50:50 lotteries de…ned over date-1 consumption levels:
where x h x l and, as before,~ is a mean zero risk. According to Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) , an individual that always ranks lottery x l ; x h +~ over lottery x h ; x l +~ is prudent. we expect an imprudent individual (i.e. one that ranks lottery x h ; x l +~ over lottery x l ; x h +~ ) to reduce his saving in response to income risk.
To see that this is indeed the case, let us return to optimization problems (1) and (2) and let us denote by x 1 and x 2 the greatest elements of X 1 and X 2 ; respectively. Since x 1 and x 2 are maximizers (not necessarily interior or unique) of (1) and (2); respectively, we have U (
and EU ( x 2 ;~ ) EU ( x 1 ;~ ) : Using the period utility functions, we can write these conditions as
Putting these two inequalities together, and multiplying throughout by ; we obtain
This condition shows that the optima of problems (1) and (2) is chosen to be in line with a preference over simple 50:50 unidimensional lotteries; namely, with the ranking of [
x 1 (resp. x 1 x 2 ) such a ranking is equivalent to Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger's (2006) characterization of prudence (resp. imprudence). We can then conclude that a prudent consumer, in the precise sense de…ned by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) , always saves more in the presence of risk than in the absence of it, while an imprudent consumer always saves less.
Following Schlesinger (2006, 2009) , an alternative intuitive characterization of prudence is via the utility premium of Friedman and Savage (1948) . De…ne the utility premium as follows
For a risk averse individual the utility premium captures the 'pain'from adding the risk~ (i.e. ! (x)
is negative) while for a risk loving individual the utility premium represents the 'joy'from such an addition (i.e. ! (x) is positive). Now notice that, regardless of the individual preferences for the presence of the risk, the utility premium is increasing in wealth if, and only if, the decision maker is prudent in the sense of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) . 6 From the previous discussion we can conclude that a precautionary saving motive will arise whenever the utility premium is increasing in wealth.
The …nal step of this exercise is to establish the set of date-1 utility functions that rank lottery x l ; x h +~ over lottery x h ; x l +~ for all x h x l ; or equivalently, that always have an increasing utility premium. Assuming that v is twice continuously di¤erentiable and using Jensen's inequality, we obtain, as Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) 
To summarize, a prudent consumer, characterized equivalently by a lottery preference à la Eeckhoudt-Schlesinger; a utility premium increasing in wealth, or a date-1 utility function with the property that v (2) (x) is increasing in x, will always exhibit precautionary saving: While this result is not too surprising, what is remarkable is that we have dispensed with most assumptions of the standard method. In particular, if a solution exists this result holds for 1) both concave and convex date-1 utility functions v, as shown by Crainich et al. (2013) 7 , 2) any date-0 utility function 6 Speci…cally, the expected utility of lottery x l ; x h +~ is greater than the expected utility of lottery
Of course, our result also implies that both risk averse and risk loving individuals that are imprudent in the Eeckhoudt-Schlesinger sense (equivalently, those decision-makers whose utility function sati…es v Our next objective is to extend this line of reasoning to more general contexts.
Preliminaries
This section introduces the basic background for the comparative statics analyses that follow. In Section 3.1. we present the class of risk changes under consideration. Then, in Section 3.2., we present some terminology from lattice theory and two important results from the theory of monotone comparative statics.
Changes in risk
Let~ 1 and~ 2 denote two random variables with values in [0; Q] : For i = 1; 2, we denote by
the distribution functions and, for k = 1; 2; ::: we de…ne the functions
The class of risk changes that we analyze is based on the following characterization provided by Ekern (1980) .
De…nition 1
We say that~ 2 is an increase in Nth-degree risk over~ 1 ; and we denote it by~ 1 N~ 2 ;
where the inequality is strict for some x and F
for k = 1; :::; N:
In words, an increase in Nth-degree risk represents an Nth-degree stochastic dominance shift in which the …rst N 1 moments of the distributions coincide. 8 For example, an increase in 2nd-degree risk coincides with Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1970) mean preserving increase in risk, while an increase in 3rd-degree risk coincides with a mean and variance preserving increase in risk that Menezes et al. (1980) labeled increase in downside risk.
The following result will be essential for the analysis that follows.
either 'good with good'(implying risk seeking and prudence) or 'good with bad'(implying risk aversion and prudence) (see Ebert (2013) ). 8 In Section 6 we present results for the more general Nth-degree stochastic dominance order.
Lemma 1 Let q be a given real valued function that is N times continuously di¤ erentiable. The following conditions are equivalent. 9 1. For all pair (
2. For all x 0; we have ( 1) N q (N ) (x) 0:
As an illustration, for N = 2; we retrieve the classical result that an agent who dislikes mean preserving spreads is an agent whose utility function is concave.
Ordering relations
Let X be a set with the partial order <. For x 0 and x 00 elements of X, let x _ x 0 denote the least upper bound, or join, of these elements, if it exists. Similarly, let x 0^x00 denote the greatest lower bound, or meet, of these elements. The set X is a lattice if, for every pair of elements x 0 and x 00 in X; the join x 0 _ x 00 and the meet x 0^x00 exist. The real line R with the usual ordering is a lattice, with x 0 _x 00 = max fx 0 ; x 00 g and x^x 0 = min fx 0 ; x 00 g for x 0 ; x 00 in R: The Euclidean space R n with the componentwise order is also a lattice, with x 0 _ x 00 = max (x 0 ; x 00 ) = (x 0 1 _ x 00 1 ; :; x 0 n _ x 00 n ) and x 0^x00 = min (x 0 ; x 00 ) = (x 0 1^x 00 1 ; :; x 0 n^x 00 n ) for x 0 ; x 00 in R n : Similarly, a subset B of X is a sublattice of X if it contains the join and the meet. For example, any subset of R is a sublattice, while B is a sublattice of R n if it is closed under the max and min operators.
In comparing optimal solutions, it will be essential to have an ordering relation over sets. As is standard in the literature on monotone comparative statics, we use the strong set order.
De…nition 2 For two sets B 0 and B 00 , we say that B 00 is higher than B 0 in the strong set order, and we write it B 00 S B 0 if for any x 0 2 B 0 and x 00 2 B 00 we have x 0 _ x 00 2 B 00 and x 0^x00 2 B 0 .
For example, for two subsets B 0 and B 00 of R we have B 00 S B 0 if for any x 0 2 B 0 and x 00 2 B 00
we have max fx 0 ; x 00 g 2 B 00 and min fx 0 ; x 00 g 2 B 0 :
The following de…nitions present important properties of functions de…ned on partially ordered sets. 9 Ekern (1980) established the fact that 2. implies 1.: He proved that~ 2 is an increase in Nth-degree risk over~ 1 De…nition 3 Given a partially ordered set T , the function f : T ! R is increasing (resp. decreas-
De…nition 4 Given a lattice X and a partially ordered set T; the function f : X T ! R has increasing (resp. decreasing) di¤ erences in (x; t) if, for all t 0 < t 00 in T ; the di¤ erence f (x; t 0 )
f (x; t 00 ) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in x:
De…nition 5 Given a lattice X, the function f : X ! R is supermodular if, for all x 0 ; x 00 in X;
When the ordering relations in De…nitions 3 5 are strict, we will explicitly point it out. For example, we will say that the function f (x; t) has strictly increasing di¤erences in (x; t) if, for all t 0 t 00 ; the di¤erence f (x; t 0 ) f (x; t 00 ) is strictly increasing in
When X is a subset of R n ; T is a subset of R m , and f : R n R m ! R is twice continuously di¤erentiable on a given interval, we obtain the well know characterization result, due to Topkis (1978) , that f (x; t) is supermodular in x for …xed t if and only if
0 for all i 6 = j, and f (x; t) has increasing di¤erences in (x; t) if and only if The following simple result will be important in our analysis.
Remark 1
If the real valued function f (x; t) has increasing (resp. decreasing) di¤ erences in (x; t) ; then v (x; t) = h 1 (x) + h 2 (t) + f (x; t) also has increasing (resp. decreasing) di¤ erences in (x; t) :
Given these de…nitions, we are ready to present two fundamental comparative statics results due to Topkis (1978) . 11 Lemma 2 (Topkis'monotonicity theorem) Let X be a lattice, B a sublattice of X; T a partially ordered set, and f : X T ! R: 12 Suppose that f (x; t) is supermodular in x on X for …xed t and has increasing di¤ erences (resp. decreasing di¤ erences) in (x; t) on X T: Then, for all t 0 < t 00 , we have arg max Lemma 3 (Topkis'monotonicity theorem (' )) Let X be a lattice, B a sublattice of X; T a partially ordered set, and f : X T ! R: Suppose that f (x; t) is supermodular in x on X for …xed t and has strictly increasing di¤ erences (resp. strictly decreasing di¤ erences) in (x; t) on X T:
Then, if x 0 2 arg max x2B f (x; t 0 ) and x 00 2 arg max x2B f (x; t 00 ), with t 0 t 00 , we have x 0 < x 00 (resp. x 0 2 x 00 ) provided the sets of solutions are nonempty.
Notice that Lemma 2 is more general than Lemma 3, in the sense that Lemma 3 invokes strictly increasing or decreasing di¤erences. With such a stronger condition, Lemma 3 shows that the sets of optimal solutions can be ordered by a stronger relation than the strong set order. For example, if there is a single decision variable, X = R; and f (x; t) has strictly increasing di¤erences, Lemma 3 implies that x 0 x 00 for every selection x 0 2 arg max x2B f (x; t 0 ) and x 00 2 arg max x2B f (x; t 00 ) with t 0 t 00 :
In the analysis that follows, we will demonstrate the usefulness of Topkis' theorems in the context of the comparative statics of risk changes (speci…cally, when T is ordered by N as de…ned in Section 3.1) and we will illustrate the close link that exists between the concepts of increasing and decreasing di¤erences with the idea of risk apportionment that has been so useful in providing intuition for the comparative statics of risk.
Single decision variable
We start by analyzing the case of a single decision variable, which is the context of many well known applications. Given a payo¤ function EU (x;~ ), where x is a unidimensional decision variable and~ is a random variable, the question we analyze is the following: How does arg max x2B EU (x;~ ) vary with changes in the random variable that are ordered by a given stochastic dominance relation?
Let us de…ne
EU (x;~ 1 ) (P.1.)
where~ 1 N~ 2 and, for expositional clarity, we assume that the constraint set B is a subset of R: 13 Our objective is to compare X 1 and X 2 :
In this context, it is standard to obtain the comparative statics of risk changes by making use of assumptions A:1: A:3: (interior solutions, strict concavity, etc.). Given these assumptions, there is a unique solution X 1 = fx 1 g that satis…es EU (1;0) (x 1 ;~ 1 ) = 0; and similarly there is a unique solution X 2 = fx 2 g that satis…es EU (1;0) (x 2 ;~ 2 ) = 0: By Lemma 1, if~ 2 is an increase in Nth-degree risk over~ 1 we have EU (1;0) (x 1 ;~ 2 ) 0 if and only if ( 1) N U (1;N ) (x; ) 0 for all x; : Given the concavity of U; EU (1;0) (x 1 ;~ 2 ) decreases with x, and so, to restore the …rst order condition, we must have x 2 x 1 .
To show that the mentioned assumptions are super ‡uous for the comparative statics result, we begin by appealing to the idea of risk apportionment. Clearly, preferences over the type of lotteries presented in the motivating example (i.e. those studied by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger Let us consider the following pair of 50:50 bivariate lotteries:
where x h x l and~ 1 N~ 2 : For a decision maker that always ranks L G over L B we have
Following Tsetlin and Winkler (2009), we can interpret this condition as saying that this individual prefers to combine a 'bad'lottery together with a 'good'lottery -rather than combining two 'bad' lotteries and two 'good'lotteries-, where 'good'and 'bad'are de…ned relative to increases in Nthdegree risk in one attribute (~ 1 N~ 2 ) and increases in 1st-degree risk in the other attribute (x h x l ). Using the terminology of Section 2, for this individual the 'pain' caused by an Nthdegree risk increase can be ameliorated by higher levels of the attribute x. Clearly, an equally valid 1 3 The assumption B R will simplify the notation, but it is not consequential for our results, which would hold for arbitrary lattices.
interpretation is that this condition re ‡ects the preferences of an Nth-degree risk loving individual for which the 'joy'caused by a risk increase can be strengthened by higher levels of the attribute x, as in our example in Section 2 of risk loving individuals displaying prudence. In either case, the di¤erence in the expected payo¤ EU (x;~ 2 ) EU (x;~ 1 ) (i.e. the 'utility premium'for Nth-degree risk increases) is increasing in x. Intuition then suggests that, when the attribute x plays the role of a decision variable as in (P:1) and (P:2), an individual that always ranks L G over L B would select a higher level of this variable when faced with an Nth-degree risk increase.
In e¤ect, note that saying that the utility premium is increasing in x (or equivalently, that the decision maker ranks L G over L B ) can be characterized as follows:
Condition (5) corresponds precisely with the property de…ned in the previous section as decreasing di¤erences (with X ordered by and T ordered by N ). This equivalency should not be too surprising: A function with decreasing di¤erences characterizes substitutability between its elements, which is precisely what the idea of preferences for risk apportionment captures. 14 By
Topkis monotonicity theorem, this condition is all that is needed to obtain the desired comparative statics result. Proposition 1 formalizes this link and it also establishes the set of decision makers for which the comparative statics result always holds.
Proposition 1 Consider problems P.1. and P.2., with~ 1 N~ 2 and B R: Suppose that U is N times continuously di¤ erentiable in and that X 1 ; X 2 are nonempty. Then, X 2 S X 1 if, equivalently, one of the following conditions hold 1. L G is preferred to L B for all~ 1 N~ 2 and all x h x l :
A dual result of Proposition 1 is that, if L B is preferred to L G for all~ 1 N~ 2 and all x h x l ; so the decision maker prefers to combine higher risks with lower levels of the deterministic attribute (i.e. prefers to combine good-with-good and bad-with-bad lotteries, as perceived by a risk averter) and his payo¤ function obeys increasing di¤erences, then X 1 S X 2 :
We emphasize that the proposition is not restricted to unique or interior solutions and that it does not impose concavity of the payo¤ function, convexity of the choice set, or di¤erentiability in the choice variable. Proposition 1 does assume that the sets of solutions are nonempty. A simple su¢ cient condition for this to be the case is that B is compact and U is continuous in x, in which case X 1 and X 2 are compact subsets of B and have least and greatest elements. By Proposition 1, the least and greatest elements of X 2 are at least as high as those of X 1 : If, in addition, X 1 and X 2 are singletons, say X 1 = fx 1 g and X 2 = fx 2 g, we have that x 2 x 1 under any of the enumerated conditions. The next result makes use of Lemma 3 to show that such an ordering also arises, without assuming a unique solution, if the decision maker has a strict ranking over the lotteries (3).
Proposition 2 Consider problems P.1. and P.2., with~ 1 N~ 2 and B R: Suppose that L G is strictly preferred to L B for all~ 1 N~ 2 and all x h > x l (equivalently, EU (x;~ ) has strictly decreasing di¤ erences in (x;~ )). Then, if X 1 ; X 2 are nonempty and x 1 2 X 1 and x 2 2 X 2 , we have
We demonstrate these results in the context of a few well known applications.
The precautionary demand for saving revisited
We begin by illustrating Proposition 1 in the context of precautionary saving. Maintaining most of the notation from Section 2, the decision-maker's problem is now the following
where i = 1; 2 and~ 1 N~ 2 . The motivating example of Section 2 is a special case of this framework
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008) analyzed problem (6) under additional assumptions A:1:; A:2:, and A:3: They showed that, given unique interior solutions X 1 = fx 1 g and X 2 = fx 2 g ; any decision maker that exhibits (N + 1) th degree risk aversion, ( 1) N v (N +1) (x) 0; increases his savings in response to an increase in Nth-degree risk, x 2 x 1 . Next, we analyze problem (6) under the proposed approach.
Consider the following pair of lotteries de…ned over date-1 consumption:
Suppose that the decision maker ranks (7) over (8) with the risks to be apportioned characterized via the partial orders N and ). Since such a ranking is equivalent to the property of decreasing di¤erences of Ev (x +~ ) and, by Remark 1, of EU (x;~ ) ; Proposition 1 readily implies the comparative statics result: X 2 S X 1 (i.e. for any x 1 2 X 1 and x 2 2 X 2 ; max fx 1 ; x 2 g 2 X 2 and min fx 1 ; x 2 g 2 X 1 -De…nition 2). We repeat the argument to highlight the power and simplicity of the approach. Let x 1 2 X 1 and x 2 2 X 2 . We
The …rst inequality follows from the de…nition of X 2 and x 2 2 X 2 : The second inequality follows from the assumption that lottery (7) is preferred to (8) . Finally, the third inequality follows from the de…nition of X 1 and x 1 2 X 1 : Since the inequalities are enclosed by zeroes, it follows that max fx 1 ; x 2 g 2 X 2 : Similarly, it is simple to show that min fx 1 ; x 2 g 2 X 1 ; so we conclude that
Lastly, notice that in line with Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger's (2008) analysis lottery (7) is preferred to lottery (8) if and only if ( 1)
is smooth): 15 No additional assumptions are necessary to establish the comparative statics result. We summarize the preceding discussion as follows.
Example 1 Let X i ; i = 1; 2; be de…ned as in (6) 
The following examples extend this line of reasoning in two directions. Example 2 looks at a more general problem of precautionary saving behavior with non-separable utility analyzed recently by Jouini et al. (2013) . Example 3 revisits Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger's (2008) analysis of precautionary saving with interest rate risk. In both examples we assume that the choice set is convex and that the payo¤ function is di¤erentiable to make the link between our results and the results of the mentioned papers more transparent.
Example 2 De…ne X i = arg max x2B EU (x;~ i ) = arg max x2B Eh (y 0 x; x +~ i ) ; i = 1; 2; where h is the (possibly non-separable) utility of date-0 and date-1 consumption and all the variables are as de…ned in problem (6) . Suppose that~ 1 N~ 2 ; that h is N + 1 times di¤ erentiable in the second argument and once in the …rst argument, and that B is a compact interval of R. Then, X 2 S X 1 if, equivalently, one of the following conditions hold
The bivariate lottery y 0 x l ; x l +~ 1 ; y 0 x h ; x h +~ 2 is preferred to the bivariate lottery y 0 x h ; x h +~ 1 ; y 0 x l ; x l +~ 2 for all~ 1 N~ 2 and all x h x l :
Example 3 De…ne X i = arg max x2B EU (x;~ i ) = arg max x2B u (y 0 x)+Ev (x~ i ) ; i = 1; 2; wherẽ i now represents the gross rate of interest. Suppose that~ 1 N~ 2 ; that v is N +1 times di¤ erentiable with its successive derivatives alternating in sign, and that B is a compact interval of R. No restrictions are imposed on u: Then, X 2 S X 1 if, equivalently, one of the following conditions hold Lottery x l~ 1 ; x h~ 2 is preferred to lottery x h~ 1 ; x l~ 2 for all~ 1 N~ 2 and all x h x l (both lotteries de…ned over date-1 consumption). 16 The measure of Nth-degree relative risk aversion (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008) ),
; is no smaller than N:
We remark that the equivalencies of the bulleted items in Examples 1, 2, and 3 are not new results. Rather, it is the robustness of the comparative statics results that we want to emphasize.
Self-protection and background risks
To illustrate Proposition 2 we present a version of the classical problem of self-protection which was recently analyzed by Wang and Li (forthcoming) using an approach similar to ours. In this problem there are two dates and the decision maker exerts e¤ort x at date-0 in order to reduce the probability of facing an adverse outcome L at date-1. The decision maker also faces a background risk at date-1 and the comparative statics of interest is whether an increase in this background risk increases or decreases e¤ort. Let us de…ne
where y 0 and y 1 represent the non-stochastic endowments at date-0 and date-1, respectively, and we assume that~ 1 2~ 2 . Wang and Li (forthcoming) established the following result.
Example 4 Let X i ; i = 1; 2; be de…ned as in (9) Thus, under the stated assumptions, any strictly prudent individual increases (weakly) his e¤ort when the background risk undergoes a mean preserving spread.
To demonstrate that this result is an example of Proposition 2, let us rewrite lifetime utility as
Since P (x) is assumed to be strictly increasing and, by strict prudence, Eg (~ ) is strictly decreasing in the order 2 (i.e. Eg (~ 1 ) < Eg (~ 2 ) for all~ 1 2~ 2 ); the product P (x) Eg (~ ) has strictly decreasing di¤erences in (x;~ ) : Using Remark 1 we can then conclude that lifetime utility also has strictly decreasing di¤erences in (x;~ ), from which the result follows. Of course, according to Proposition 2 the result applies more broadly (e.g. without any restrictions on the function u (x)),
while Proposition 1 can be used to establish the comparative statics of risk for a broader set of decision makers.
Multiple decision variables
Let us now suppose that the choice vector is m dimensional. De…ne
where the constraint set B is assumed to be a sublattice of R m :
Proceeding as in the previous section, consider the following pair of 50:50 lotteries:
Again, such a preference characterizes the property that the premium for Nth-degree risk changes,
; is increasing in x. Equivalently, (11) corresponds to the notion of decreasing di¤erences in De…nition 4. Contrary to the case of a single decision variable, condition (11) is not su¢ cient to order the sets of maximizers X 1 and X 2 : Intuitively, this condition implies that the decision maker prefers to combine higher risks with higher levels of all of the other variables.
But if the decision maker perceives these latter variables to be substitutes for each other, he may choose to respond to the change in risk in (P.3) and (P.4) by increasing some decision variables and decreasing others. Therefore, following most of the literature on monotone comparative statics (and Topkis' monotonicity theorems in particular), we will restrict the analysis to the case of complementary decision variables, where complementarity is captured by supermodularity of the payo¤ function. 17 Clearly, this assumption is not made without loss of generality since there are important multidimensional decision problems in which the controls are not complementary.
We remark, however, that for the case with m = 2 this assumption is not as restrictive since a simple change of variable can in most cases transform a problem in which the decision variables are substitutes into one in which the decision variables are complements. 18 We will illustrate this ordering-reversing 'trick'in an example below.
Proposition 3 Consider problems P.3. and P.4. with~ 2 N~ 1 : Suppose that B is a sublattice of R m , that U is N times continuously di¤ erentiable in and supermodular in x for …xed , and that X 1 ; X 2 are nonempty. 19 Then, X 2 S X 1 if, equivalently, one of the following conditions hold 1. L G is preferred to L B for all~ 1 N~ 2 and all x h x l :
Moreover, if L G is strictly preferred to L B for all~ 1 N~ 2 and all x h > x l ; then, for x 1 2 X 1 and
Conversely, if U is supermodular in x for …xed but L B is preferred to L G for all~ 1 N~ 2 and all x h x l (i.e.
( 1) N U (0;N ) (x; ) is decreasing in x, and the payo¤ function has increasing di¤erences in (x; )); we have
if all decision variables are complementary and they all respond in the same direction to the risk change when considered in isolation, they will still change in the same direction in the multiple control problem. If U is smooth, these conditions are equivalent to 1) supermodularity:
@ 2 @x i @x j U 0 for all for all i 6 = j and 2) decreasing di¤erences: ( 1)
0 for all i). 21 We provide two applications of Proposition 3.
Borrowing and human capital investments
Consider a stochastic version of Lochner and Monge-Naranjo's (2011) 2-date model of borrowing and human capital investments. Given an endowment of wealth y; in the …rst period the decision 1 8 Even in this case, the assumption restricts the decision variables to be always substitutes or always complements. 1 9 As mentioned for the case of a single decision variable, a su¢ cient condition for the sets of solutions to be nonempty is that U is continuous and the constraint set B is compact. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011), we can interpret the multiplicative term~ as the worker's ability, which is uncertain in our setting. De…ne
Notice that (12) is an extension of the traditional model of precautionary saving. That is,
given a …xed level of human capital investment and setting d = x, problem (12) is formally equivalent to precautionary saving problem (6) . The reason we use borrowing rather than saving as a decision variable is that, if u and v are concave as traditionally assumed, the payo¤ function is supermodular in (h; d) (i.e. borrowing and human capital investments are complementary), as required by Proposition 3. Of course, borrowing is not restricted to be positive, so any conclusion about changes in borrowing can be characterized as a change in saving in the opposite direction.
It is in reference to this kind of change of variable that we said that supermodularity is not as restrictive in problems with two decision variables. Now, according to our previous results, if borrowing and human capital investments respond in the same direction to a change in risk when considered in isolation, the consumer will still respond in the same direction when he evaluates the joint decisions. In e¤ect, intuition tells us that greater uncertainty surrounding the return from human capital will reduce borrowing and the accumulation of human capital (i.e. the payo¤ function has increasing di¤erences). The following result provides conditions for this to be the case when~ 2 is a mean preserving spread over~ 1 :
Example 5 Let X i ; i = 1; 2; be de…ned as in (12) 
For example, if v (x) is smooth, a mean preserving spread in the return to human capital will decrease the least and greatest selections of borrowing and human capital investment if the decision maker is risk averse v (2) 0; prudent v (3) 0; and the measure of 2nd-degree partial risk aversion (Chiu et al. (2012) ),
; is no larger than 2.
Risky R&D investments
Consider a monopolist that selects the production level q and the level of investment r (in units)
of research and development (R&D). This investment allows the company to improve the methods of production, reducing per unit costs. The e¤ectiveness of the R&D investment, however, is uncertain. In particular, suppose that the unit cost of production is given by c (r e ) ; where r e = r~ and the random variable~ 0 captures the e¤ectiveness of R&D. The monetary cost of the R&D investment is g (r) : The problem for the monopolist facing demand function p (q) is to maximize expected pro…ts. De…ne
Notice that the pro…t function is supermodular in (q; r) as long as the per unit cost is decreasing.
Using this fact, the following result characterizes the e¤ect of a mean preserving spread on output and R&D investment.
Example 6 Let X i ; i = 1; 2; be de…ned as in (13) and~ 1 2~ 2 . Suppose that B is a compact sublattice of R 2 and that c (r ) is twice di¤ erentiable. If c (1) (r ) < 0 and c (2) (r ) qr 2 is increasing in (q; r) (e.g. if c (2) (r ) is positive and non-decreasing), then, the pro…t function is supermodular in (q; r) and has increasing di¤ erences in [(q; r) ;~ ]; thus,
Therefore, greater uncertainty about the e¤ectiveness of R&D makes the …rm more cautious, in the sense that the least and greatest selections of output and R&D spending decrease. Importantly, this result is independent of the properties of the demand function p (q) and of the R&D cost function g (r).
Our results can be readily extended to stochastic dominance orders other than Nth-degree risk increases. We present two examples. First, consider Nth-degree stochastic dominance shifts as characterized by Jean (1980) . Using the notation in De…nition 1,~ 2 is dominated by~ 1 in the sense of Nth-degree stochastic dominance; and we denote it by~ 1 N SD~ 2 ; if F
, where the inequality is strict for some x; and F Next, suppose that uncertainty is multidimensional. In particular, consider two random variables,~ 1 and~ 2 , and a dependence structure in the form of positive quandrant dependence (PQD) (see e.g. Lehmann (1966) ). 23 Recall that (
for all t 1 and t 2 . That is, compared to the baseline of independence,~ 1 and~ 2 are more likely to take either high or low values at the same time. Given two independent random variables ~ 24 
Concluding remarks
The standard approach for establishing the comparative statics of risk changes in optimization problems has typically been con…ned to comparing unique interior solutions. Even within such a limited framework, it is often di¢ cult to interpret the conditions involved in the comparative statics results, which frequently require signing high-order derivatives and cross-derivatives. The 2 3 For related concepts of dependence where our analysis applies as well, see Yanagimoto and Okamoto (1969) Topkis (1978) to show that such an idea can do even more: The ranking of properly-designed lottery pairs is all that is needed to order the set of maximizers. A decision maker that ranks lottery pairs in a way that "more of x" is preferable whenever there is "less of~ " (in our setting, an increase in Nth degree risk) will accordingly, in the context of an optimization problem, increase his choice of x whenever~ "decreases". The assumptions frequently made to ensure unique and interior solutions do not change this basic intuition and, thus, are inessential for the comparative statics result. Moreover, this basic intuition still holds in problems with multiple decision variables that are complementary.
While we assumed throughout that the decision maker behaves as an expected utility maximizer, our characterization of the comparative statics exercise via preferences over lotteries should permit to extend the analysis to non-expected utility frameworks. It would also be interesting to apply the methods studied in this paper to study distributional shifts other than stochastic dominance orders. In particular, we conjecture that these methods can be readily applied to study the economic consequences of distributional shifts in the form of almost stochastic dominance (Leshno and Levy, 2002 ). 25 Our results should also have rami…cations beyond optimization problems. For example, in the context of deterministic parametric changes, monotonicity results have proved useful for the development of the theory of supermodular games (e.g. Topkis (1979) , Vives (1990) , Milgrom and Roberts (1994) ). In the same vein, the present results may be extended to analyze the comparative statics of risk changes in equilibrium models. 26 Finally, we only touched upon a few applications of the theory, and we expect that many more will follow.
Appendix. Proofs of main results
Propositions 1, 2, and 3 are direct applications of Topkis' monotonicity theorems combined with Lemma 1. Next, we provide succinct proofs of these results. should prove helpful in this endeavor. 2 6 Nocetti and Smith (2015) present some results along these lines.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let x 1 2 X 1 and x 2 2 X 2 . We need to show that max fx 1 ; x 2 g 2 X 2 and min fx 1 ; x 2 g 2 X 1 . We have 0 EU (max fx 1 ; x 2 g ;~ 2 ) EU (x 2 ;~ 2 ) EU (max fx 1 ; x 2 g ;~ 1 ) EU (x 2 ;~ 1 ) 0
From left to right, the …rst inequality follows from the de…nition of X 2 and x 2 2 X 2 : The second inequality follows from the assumption that L G is always preferred to L B , so condition (4) holds and the payo¤ function has decreasing di¤erences in (x;~ ). The third inequality follows from the de…nition of X 1 and x 1 2 X 1 : Since the inequalities are enclosed by zeroes, it follows that max fx 1 ; x 2 g 2 X 2 : Similarly, note that 0 EU (x 1 ;~ 1 ) EU (min fx 1 ; x 2 g ;~ 1 ) EU (x 1 ;~ 2 ) EU (min fx 1 ; x 2 g ;~ 2 ) 0
where, from left to right, the …rst inequality follows from the de…nition of X 1 and x 1 2 X 1 ; the second inequality follows from the assumption that L G is always preferred to L B , and the third inequality follows from the de…nition of X 2 and x 2 2 X 2 : Therefore, min fx 1 ; x 2 g 2 X 1 :
It remains to show that condition 2. is equivalent to condition 1. in the proposition. By Lemma 1 the condition E U x h ;~ 2 U x l ;~ 2 E U x h ;~ 1 U x l ;~ 1 0 holds for all~ 2 and~ 1 such that~ 1 N~ 2 if and only if ( 1) N U (0;N ) x h ; U (0;N ) x l ; 0 for all ; from which the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let x 1 2 X 1 and x 2 2 X 2 . Suppose that x 1 > x 2 . We have 0 EU (x 1 ;~ 2 ) EU (x 2 ;~ 2 ) > EU (x 1 ;~ 1 ) EU (x 2 ;~ 1 ) 0
where the …rst inequality follows from x 2 2 X 2 ; the second strict inequality follows from the assumption that L G is strictly preferred to L B (i.e. strictly decreasing di¤erences); and the third inequality follows from x 1 2 X 1 : Since the inequalities are enclosed by zeroes, there is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3
Following the line of reasoning in the proof of Proposition 1, let x 1 2 X 1 and x 2 2 X 2 . We need to
show that max (x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 X 2 and min (x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 X 1 . We have 0 EU (max (x 1 ; x 2 ) ;~ 2 ) EU (x 2 ;~ 2 ) EU (max (x 1 ; x 2 ) ;~ 1 ) EU (x 2 ;~ 1 )
EU (x 1 ;~ 1 ) EU (min (x 1 ; x 2 ) ;~ 1 ) 0 where the …rst inequality follows from the de…nition of X 2 and x 2 2 X 2 ; the second inequality follows from the assumption that L G is preferred to L B (i.e. condition (11) holds, so the payo¤ function has decreasing di¤erences in (x;~ )); the third inequality follows from supermodularity, and the fourth inequality follows from the de…nition of X 1 and x 1 2 X 1 : The conclusion then follows.
Furthermore, by Lemma 1, property (11) holds for all~ 2 and~ 1 such that~ 2 N~ 1 if and only if
( 1) N U (0;N ) x h ; U (0;N ) x l ; 0 for all : To prove the second part of the proposition, suppose that max (x 1 ; x 2 ) > x 2 , let (11) be a strict inequality, and use the same argument as above to …nd a contradiction.
